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HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LITIGATION: THE 
CASE OF JESSICA ERNST & THE PROBLEM OF 
FACTUAL CAUSATION 
Oliver Hutchison† 
ABSTRACT: Modern hydraulic fracturing technology and horizontal drilling have made it 
possible and profitable for oil and gas companies to extract natural gas from underground 
shale and coal formations that would otherwise be inaccessible. Horizontal drilling, in 
particular, has enabled oil and gas companies to turn under-producing reservoirs into profitable 
extractive sites. However, despite its technological achievements and economic efficiencies, 
hydraulic fracturing is not without controversy. One of the main concerns is the potential for 
groundwater contamination. While experts disagree, the preponderance of evidence suggests 
that hydraulic fracturing can and has resulted in the unintended toxic contamination of nearby 
groundwater sources. In the United States, hydraulic fracturing litigation is on the rise, and 
numerous lawsuits have been filed by landowners against oil and gas companies and 
regulatory agencies in negligence, nuisance, trespass and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher for the 
alleged contamination of their groundwater. In Canada, only one such lawsuit has been filed: 
Ernst v. EnCana Corp. Common law remedies have proved to be unattainable for most 
plaintiffs in these cases. The uncertain underground geological consequences of hydraulic 
fracturing make establishing factual causation a significant legal hurdle. A strict regulatory 
system that imposes a presumption of liability on oil and gas developers is necessary to 
encourage safe extractive practices and protect the legal interests of landowners. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hydraulic Fracturing (or ‘fracking’) litigation is on the rise.1 In the United 
States, it is now common for plaintiffs to allege that hydraulic fracturing 
processes have contaminated groundwater sources.2 The primary purpose of this 
paper is to examine the common law remedies available to plaintiffs in these 
cases. I argue that the common law, because of the requirement of factual 
causation, is inadequately equipped to provide redress to plaintiffs in these cases. 
A more proactive approach, through strict regulation, is necessary to protect 
people and the environment in the face of presently uncertain geological effects 
of hydraulic fracturing. 
In Part II, I will briefly outline the historical origins of hydraulic fracturing, 
its modern day uses, and the controversy surrounding the practice. In Part III, I 
will survey contemporary fracking cases and suggest that as a practical matter, 
plaintiffs will have more success in holding oil and gas companies to account 
when groundwater contamination is not at issue. In Part IV, I will analyze the 
pioneering Canadian case of Ernst v. EnCana Corp. and argue that the plaintiff, 
Jessica Ernst, faces a near insurmountable task in establishing the requirement of 
factual causation in her pending action against the EnCana Corporation. Finally, 
in Part V, I will argue that, because of the element of factual causation, tort law 
is ineffective and cannot achieve its functions (compensation, vindication, 
punishment, and deterrence) in hydraulic fracturing groundwater contamination 
cases. A strict regulatory system that imposes a presumption of liability in cases 
of hydraulic fracking is required. 
II. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
A. A Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to increase oil and gas production 
from underground oil or gas-bearing rock formations through the injection of 
high-pressure fracking fluid that fractures reservoir rock, thus releasing trapped 
natural gas or oil.3 The fracturing fluid is comprised of water, chemicals, and 
propping agents such as sand.4 The propping agents are used to ensure that the 
fractures created remain propped open after the pressurized injection of the 
fracturing fluid stops, thus allowing hydrocarbons (e.g., crude oil or natural gas) 
to flow to production wells.5 Today, fracking is a very common well-stimulation 
                                                 
 1 Barclay R. Nicholson, Analysis of Litigation Involving Shale and Hydraulic Fracturing 
Litigation, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, at 1 (2014). 
 2 See Blake Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing Tort Litigation Summary, U. DAYTON SCH. OF 
L., at 32 (2012). 
 3 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas: Impacts from the Hydraulic 
Fracturing Water Cycle on Drinking Water Resources in the United States, 3-2 (2016), 
EPA/600/R-16/236Fa.. 
 4 William Cranch, et al., Responding to Landowner Complaints of Water Contamination 
from Oil and Gas Activity: Best Practices, HARVARD L. SCH. EMMET ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y 
CLINIC AND THE ENVTL. POL’Y INITIATIVE, at 9 (2014). 
 5 Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 3, at 3.2. 
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technique. In the United States, the jurisdiction that first made use of this 
technology, some 80,000 wells have been drilled as of 2005,6 and it is estimated 
that “over 90 percent of all oil and gas wells . . . are hydraulically fractured.”7 In 
more appreciable terms, it is estimated that more than fifteen million Americans 
now live within one mile of a fracking operation.8 
While hydraulic fracturing is a relatively novel process (having its origins in 
the 1948 Kansas oil fields),9 the process of fracturing subsurface rock formations 
to stimulate underground resource production began as early as the late 1800s,10 
emerging shortly after the beginning of the United States oil boom.11 Around this 
time, oil producers were keen to find a solution to the problem of anemic oil 
wells.12 Colonel Edward Roberts, a Civil War veteran, developed what would 
come to be known as the ‘Roberts Petroleum Torpedo’: the first fracturing 
technology. The process at that time involved lowering an explosive device 
(collection of nitroglycerin-filled canisters) into the base of a well and then 
detonating it to fracture the rock and allow the oil to flow more easily.13 Roberts 
claims to have come up with the idea while serving in the Army of the Potomac 
at the Battle of Fredericksburg,14 where, in the midst of battle, he observed 
cannonballs (fired underwater) shatter and break up stone canals.15 Roberts’ 
subsequently developed ‘torpedoes’, and though these were met with initial 
skepticism by well operators, they were ultimately adopted by industry. The 
technology was demonstrated to have the potential to more than quadruple a 
well’s daily production of oil.16 This process was colloquially termed ‘well-
shooting’, and despite its associated dangers, was largely successful in breaking 
up oil-bearing formations to stimulate well production and to increase total 
resource recovery.17 While this technology allowed operators to extend the 
production life of a well, the unrefined technology left much to be desired in 
terms of truly maximizing a well’s productive capacity.18 
                                                 
 6 Jolie Schamber, Utilizing Home Rule: The Case for Restricting Hydraulic Fracturing at 
the Local Level, 31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 36 (2005). 
 7 Allan Ingleson & Tina Hunter, A Regulatory Comparison of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Fluid Disclosure Regimes in the United States, Canada, and Australia, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
217, 221 (2014). 
 8 Schamber, supra note 6, at 36. 
 9 Craig Miner, Discovery! Cycles of Change in the Kansas Oil and Gas Industry, at 218 
(1987). 
 10 Carl T. Montgomery & Micheal B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an 
Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Dec. 2010, 26, 27. 
 11 Andrew Nikiforuk, SLICK WATER, at 32 (2015). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 33. 
 14 Charles A. Whiteshot, The Oil Well Driller: A History of the World’s Greatest 
Enterprise, THE OIL INDUSTRY 755 (The Acme Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 1905). 
 15 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 33 (Roberts noticed that the water “damped” the 
concussion of the cannonball and forced the energy out “in a butterfly like formation” that 
fractured the structural integrity of the canal’s stone). 
 16 Whiteshot, supra note 14, at 755. 
 17 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 10, at 27. 
 18 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 37-8. 
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In 1949, hydraulic fracturing first emerged as a technology that could further 
maximize well production.19 Stanolind Oil injected 1,000 gallons of naphthenic-
acid-and-palm-oil (napalm) thickened with gasoline down a wellbore to stimulate 
a gas-producing limestone formation 2,400 feet beneath the surface.20 While the 
productive capacity of this particular well did not significantly improve, in the 
first year of widespread commercial hydraulic fracturing treatments, 332 wells 
were ‘treated’ and the average production increase was around 75%.21 This 
marked a turning point in oil and gas extraction in that it allowed industry to 
target and extract resources from unconventional reservoirs.22 
Today, modern hydraulic fracturing technology and horizontal drilling have 
made it possible and profitable for oil and gas companies to extract natural gas 
from underground shale and coal formations that have historically been 
inaccessible.23 Since 1950, in the province of Alberta alone, approximately 
171,000 wells have been drilled for the purposes of hydraulic fracturing.24 
Horizontal drilling, in particular, has allowed producers to turn uneconomic 
reservoirs into economically viable ones.25 The prevalence and use of this 
technology has enabled one horizontal well to produce natural gas at a rate of 
approximately twenty conventional vertical wells and at a fraction of the capital 
investment.26 It comes as no surprise then, according to the Alberta Energy 
Regulator (“AER”), formerly known as the Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (“ERCB”), from 2008 to 2012 about 5,000 horizontal wells were drilled in 
Alberta.27 
B. Controversy 
Despite its technological achievements and economic efficiencies, hydraulic 
fracturing is not without controversy. A chief concern is the contamination of 
groundwater. Research has shown that fracking fluids (and the chemicals therein) 
can migrate or leak into underground fresh water sources.28 Upwards of 600 
                                                 
 19 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 10, at 27. 
 20 Keith Luft et al., Regulatory and Liability Issues in Horizontal Multi-Stage Fracturing, 
50 ALTA. L. REV. 403, 405 (2012). 
 21 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 10, at 27. 
 22 See Norman J. Hyne, Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling 
& Production (PenWell, 3d ed. 2012) “Unconventional” reservoirs are those that have very 
low permeability and are much less pourous. These deposits require specialized methods (like 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling) for production. “Conventional” deposits are those 
that are sufficiently porous and/or have interconnected pathways that allow hydrocarbons to 
flow through the target formation to the wellbore with little or stimulation). 
 23 Cranch, et al, supra note 4, at 9. 
 24 Kimberly Howard, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing, 54 ALTA. L. REV. 141, 147 
(2016). 
 25 Luft et al, supra note 20, at 404. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Energy Resources Conservation Board, ERCB Seeking Feedback on Regulatory 
Approach for Unconventional Development, at 30 (2012), www.aer.ca/documents/news-
releases/NR2012-13.pdf. 
 28 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing for 
Oil and Gas on Drinking Water Resources, 6-11, 6-57 (2015), EPA/600/R-15/047 [hereinafter 
Water Resources]. 
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chemicals have been identified in the various fracking fluids used by industry, 
including methanol, ethylene glycol, diesel fuel, and naphthalene.29 Many of 
these chemicals are harmful to human health if consumed or exposed to in 
sufficient quantities. It is particularly noteworthy that some of these chemicals 
have the potential to affect the endocrine system, which is the “system of glands 
and hormones that regulates vital functions such as body growth, response to 
stress, sexual development, rate of metabolism, intelligence . . . , and the ability 
to reproduce.”30 Additionally, there is the possibility that the natural gas 
(methane) contaminates groundwater sources through unintended migration from 
the fracture zone.31 While dissolved methane in drinking water is not yet known 
to be a health hazard, “it is an asphyxiant in enclosed spaces and an explosion 
and fire hazard.”32 
Despite the toxic and dangerous substances used in and released by 
hydraulic fracturing, many believe its risks and potential dangers are overstated. 
One group of researchers (with ties to the industry) believes that “hydraulic 
fracturing has, for decades, been safely conducted in the completion of thousands 
of wells in Western Canada [and] this suggest[s] there is no systemic or inherent 
risk associated with . . . hydraulic fracturing.”33 Despite the above non sequitur, 
there is some research to suggest that the above statement may contain some 
truth; at least as far as methane contamination is concerned.34 For example, a 
report published by the Center for Rural Pennsylvania (a bipartisan, bicameral 
legislative agency that serves as a resource for rural policy within the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly) sampled 233 wells in proximity to Marcellus 
shale gas wells in rural regions and found: 
When comparing dissolved methane concentrations in the 48 water wells 
that were sampled both before and after drilling (from Phase 1), the 
research found no statistically significant increases in methane levels after 
drilling and no significant correlation to distance from drilling. However, 
the researchers suggest that more intensive research on the occurrence and 
sources of methane in water wells is needed.35 
                                                 
 29 The Endocrine Disruption Exchange, Health Effects Spreadsheet and Summary 
Statement, at 4 (2011). 
 30 Id. at 4-5. 
 31 See Samuel S. Harrison, Evaluating System for Ground-Water Contamination Hazards 
Due to Gas-Well Drilling on the Glaciated Appalachian Plateau, 21 GROUNDWATER 689, 689 
(1983); see also Samuel S. Harrison, Contamination of Aquifers by Overpressuring the 
Annulus of Oil and Gas Wells, 23 GROUNDWATER 317, 317 (1985); see also Stephen G. 
Osborn et al., Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, 108 PNAS 8172, 8173 (2011). 
 32 Osborn et al., Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing 108 PNAS 8172, 8173 (2011). 
 33 Luft et al, supra note 20, at 436. 
 34 See Lisa J. Molofsky et al., Evaluation of Methane Sources in Groundwater in 
Northeastern Pennsylvania, 51 GROUNDWATER 333, 333 (2013). 
 35 Elizabeth W. Boyer et al, CTR. FOR RURAL PENNSYLVANIA, The Impact of Marcellus 
Gas Drilling on Rural Drinking Water Supplies (2011). 
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Even the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), at one time, believed 
that the hydraulic fracturing posed “little or no threat to underground sources of 
drinking water.”36 However, the EPA has since changed its mind and now 
believes that “hydraulic fracturing activities can impact drinking water resources 
under certain circumstances.”37 While experts disagree as to the degree of 
environmental and health risks associated with hydraulic fracturing, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that it can and has resulted in the 
contamination of underground drinking sources. 
III. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LITIGATION 
Seemingly in tandem with the increased public scrutiny of hydraulic 
fracturing, the number of civil cases involving hydraulic fracturing has risen.38 
However, this rise has only been observed in the United States, a jurisdiction 
where hydraulic fracturing wells have been dug or permitted in more than twenty 
states.39 At the time of writing, in Canada, there has only been one lawsuit filed 
by a private landowner for property damage caused by hydraulic fracturing:40 
Ernst v. EnCana Corp.41 The plaintiff, Jessica Ernst, alleges that her well has 
been contaminated as a result of the defendant’s hydraulic fracturing operations 
near her home.42 While there have been some recent developments,43 this first-of-
its-kind case is still pending. Therefore, there is a total lack of precedent in 
Canada on the common law remedies that plaintiffs can receive in hydraulic 
fracturing groundwater contamination cases. By comparison, in the United 
States, landowners have filed numerous lawsuits against oil and gas companies 
alleging, among other things, contamination of groundwater.44 Since litigation in 
this area is also relatively novel, the majority of American cases are still pending, 
if they have not already settled or been dismissed.45 
There is at least one case demonstrating that plaintiffs might be able to 
receive substantial monetary damages for groundwater contamination caused by 
fracking operations. In Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil and Gas, residents of Dimock and 
Montrose, Pennsylvania sued the defendant for “improperly conducting 
hydrofracturing and other natural gas production activities that allowed the 
                                                 
 36 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking 
Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs ES-1 (2014). 
 37 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 26 (emphasis added). 
 38 Nicholson, supra note 1, at 1. 
 39 Elizabeth Ridlington et al., Fracking by the Numbers, ENV’T AMERICA RES. & POL’Y 
CTR., 4 (2016). 
 40 Luft et al, supra note 20, at 424. 
 41 Jessica Ernst v. EnCana Corp., Energy Resources Conservation Board and Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Alberta, [2013] A.B.Q.B 537 (Can.) (Ernst Statement of Claim). 
 42 Id. ¶13. 
 43 See Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, [2017] S.C.C. 1 (Can.) (one of the named 
defendants, the ERCB, cannot be held liable in negligence or for breach of 2(b) Charter 
rights). 
 44 Nicholson, supra note 1, at 105. 
 45 Barclay R. Nicholson, Fracking: Are the Regulators Coming or Not? A Review of the 
State of the Industry, 57 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-20 (2011). 
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release of methane, natural gas, and other toxins onto [their] land and into their 
groundwater.”46 The plaintiffs, comprised of sixty-three individuals, claim that 
they have experienced “property damage and physical illness, that they live in 
constant fear of future illness, and that they suffer severe emotional stress.”47 
Through a series of settlements and court rulings, only four individual plaintiffs 
remained when the jury was asked to determine whether the defendant was 
negligent in drilling two wells and whether the wells created a nuisance in 
contaminating local water sources.48 On March 10th, 2016, the jury awarded one 
family $2.6 million and another $1.4 million. Cabot Oil subsequently filed a 
motion for a new trial, a motion to set aside the verdict, and a motion for 
damages remittitur. The case is still pending.49 
While Fiorentino suggests that plaintiffs might receive substantial monetary 
damages for proven water contamination, so far it appears that plaintiffs have 
had more success in suing oil and gas developers when water contamination is 
not stated as a loss. In Hiser v. XTO Energy Inc., the plaintiff, Ruby Hiser, 
alleged that her home was damaged by vibrations caused by the nearby drilling 
activity of the defendant.50 A jury returned a verdict in her favor on the claims of 
negligence, private nuisance, and trespass, and awarded her $100,000 in 
compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages.51 A similar result was 
reached in Alford v. East Gas Ohio Co, where a jury assigned $132,000 in 
damages to a family that experienced excessive noise, fumes, and vibration on 
their property from the operation of nearby compressor stations run by the 
defendant company.52 
The damages awarded in these cases are relatively low compared to those in 
Fiorentino. However, from a pragmatic perspective, cases which do not allege 
groundwater contamination as a loss, are easier to plead and prove. They are thus 
more likely to ensure that plaintiffs have access to a common law remedy. This is 
because establishing factual causation in hydraulic fracturing groundwater 
contamination cases is notoriously difficult. Ernst’s pending case is a prime 
example. She might have had a strong claim in nuisance for the incessant and 
‘intolerable’ noise pollution caused by EnCana’s compressors,53 but no such 
claim appears in her statement of claim; her case focuses solely on groundwater 
contamination. 
                                                 
 46 Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil and Gas, 750 F.Supp. 2d 506, 509 (2010). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Watson, supra note 2, at 32. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Hiser v. XTO Energy, No. 4:11CV00517 KGB, 2013 WL 5467186, at 1 (E.D. Ark. 
Sept. 30, 2013). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Watson, supra note 2, at 19 
 53 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 100. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: ERNST V ENCANA CORP 
A. Background 
In 1982, after earning an undergraduate degree in environmental science 
from the University of Guelph and a Masters in Science from the Ontario 
Veterinary College, Jessica Ernst moved out west to find work.54 She initially 
worked as a field supervisor and permit agent for Summit Land Consultants 
before she and her husband (now divorced) started their own land agent 
business.55 After the divorce, in 1994, Ernst started her own firm: Ernst 
Environmental Services. She worked as a consultant for oil and gas companies 
and specialized in environmental impact assessments of resource extraction on 
fish, valleys, rivers and archaeological sites.56 
One of the companies that Ernst worked for during this period was EnCana. 
She began working for them when they emerged in the Canadian oil and gas 
market following the merger of two independent oil and gas companies, 
PanCanadian Energy and Alberta Energy Company Ltd.57 Today, EnCana is a 
large, multi-national oil and gas company that conducts extensive natural gas 
extraction projects in both Canada and the United States.58 With access to more 
than seventeen million acres of oil and gas leases, EnCana is one of the biggest 
energy producing companies in North America.59 As of 2015, EnCana’s 
Canadian operations had access to approximately 3.7 million gross acres of land 
and were operating approximately 6,500 producing wells (the vast majority of 
which are natural gas wells, as opposed to oil-producing wells).60 
As a consultant for EnCana, Ernst’s primary responsibility was to assist the 
corporation with project consultations. Her role was a facilitative one; she 
informed all interested parties of the land use and environmental consequences 
associated with oil and gas development (e.g., consequences of forest 
fragmentation from wells and pipelines, traditional land uses, fate of endangered 
species).61 Ernst’s employment relationship with EnCana, though, would not last 
long because of the drilling that EnCana began near her property. 
It is alleged by Ernst that between 2001 and 2006, EnCana engaged in a 
program of ‘shallow drilling’ for coal-bed methane gas and other formations 
from the Horseshoe geological formation located underneath Rosebud, Alberta 
(Ernst’s home town).62 Some of this ‘shallow drilling’ was said to be 
‘experimental’ in that EnCana was trying to figure out how to “coax methane out 
                                                 
 54 Id. at 22. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Our History, ENCANA CORP., www.EnCana.com/about/history/ (last visited 2016). 
 58 Corporate Presentation, ENCANA CORP., www.EnCana.com/about/ (last visited 2017). 
 59 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 95. 
 60 ENCANA CORP., Annual Information Form (2016), http://www.EnCana.com/pdf/
investors/financial/annual-reports/2015/annual-information-form-2015.pdf (last visited 2017). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Jessica Ernst v. EnCana Corp., Energy Resources Conservation Board and Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Alberta, [2013] A.B.Q.B 537 (Can.) (Ernst Statement of Claim), at 6. 
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of 10 to 30 inch-thick coal seems rest[ing] 400 to 600 meters underground.”63 
Ernst believes that EnCana had, “in secret fracked 190 gas wells above the so-
called base of groundwater protection.”64 This type of shallow hydraulic 
fracturing greatly increases the chances of underground water contamination. 
Researchers at Duke University have demonstrated that “[m]ethane 
concentrations were 17-times higher on average (19.2 mg CH4 L−1) in shallow 
wells from active drilling and extraction areas than in wells from non-active 
areas (1.1 mg L−1 mg CH4 L−1).”65 In 2011, the AER also acknowledged the 
risks associated with the practice of shallow drilling.66 
 As a result of EnCana’s alleged failure to adhere to their own policies of 
acting ethically and engaging in good public consultation before undertaking 
these projects, Ernst (who it is fair to say may be regarded as a scrupulous 
person)67 submitted her letter of resignation on September 9th, 2004.68 
Subsequently, in 2005, Ernst alleged that she noticed her drinking water was 
“seriously contaminated with a flammable substance.”69 She alleges that EnCana 
“directly targeted and hydraulically fractured the geological formations that 
comprise the Rosebud Aquifer” and that EnCana “knew or should have known 
that it was perforating and fracturing in-use aquifers that provided potable water 
to the Ernst Water Well.”70 In 2007, she sued EnCana and the Alberta regulators, 
the first lawsuit of its kind in Canada.71 In her ‘fresh statement of claim’ (i.e. her 
second amended statement of claim), filed on April 26th, 2012, Ernst lists 
EnCana, the ERCB, and the Province of Alberta as defendants. She was suing 
EnCana in negligence, nuisance, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, and in trespass;72 
                                                 
 63 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 97. 
 64 Id. at 137. 
 65 Osborn, supra note 31, at 8173. 
 66 Energy Resources Conservation Board, Gov’t of Alberta, Unconventional Gas 
Regulatory Framework – Jurisdictional Review 10 (2011). 
 67 See Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 239. (“In 2011, Ernst was awarded the UNANIMA 
Woman of Courage Award for her active role in speaking out against the harmful and illegal 
practices associated with fracking; see also Woman of Courage Award, UNANIMA INT’L, 
http://www.unanima-international.org/what-we-do/programs/women-and-children/woman-
ofcourage-award (2011); Ernst has also been internationally recognized as the “Joan of Arc of 
Alberta” and the “Rachel Carson of the Environment”). 
 68 See id. at 103-04, (In her letter of resignation she wrote, “There are thousands of wells 
and kilometres of pipelines and roads proposed without adequate or diligent consultation or 
warning or mitigation planned . . . I cannot in good conscience work for a company operating 
in such a manner”). 
 69 See Jessica Ernst v. EnCana Corp., Energy Resources Conservation Board and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta [2013] A.B.Q.B. 537 (Can.) (Amended Statement of 
Claim) ¶ 56 (2012). While not proven as fact in court, Ernst, in 2005, had her water test by an 
independent lab. The results demonstrated methane concentrations of 29.4 mg/l dissolved in 
her water. This is much higher than the test done by Alberta Environment in 2006, which 
showed only 11.2mg/l to 14.2 mg/l in her water. In her amended statement of claim, Ernst 
alleges that the Alberta Environment test was negligently done. 
 70 Jessica Ernst v. EnCana Corp., Energy Resources Conservation Board and Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Alberta, [2013] A.B.Q.B 537 (Can.) (Ernst Statement of Claim), at 9. 
 71 EnCana Corp., Statement of Defence filed in Response to Jessica Ernst’s Fresh 
Statement of Claim (2013). 
 72 Ernst, Statement of Claim (2012), supra note 41, at 5-23. 
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the Province of Alberta for negligent administration of a regulatory regime; and 
the ERCB for negligent administration of a regulatory regime and for breaching 
her s. 2(b) rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms73 
(“Charter”). Regarding this last claim, Ernst pleaded that, with full knowledge of 
her credible complaint, the ERCB’s arbitrary decision to restrict Ernst’s 
communication with them until such time as she ceased speaking negatively 
about the ERCB in public breached her s. 2(b) Charter rights.74 In total, she is 
seeking approximately $11 million in damages.75 
B. Proceedings to Date 
This case is moving at a slow pace and is still effectively in the pleadings 
stage. While Ernst initially filed the action in 2007, the filing of preliminary 
motions by the defendants has slowed this case; EnCana did not file a statement 
of defense until 2013.76 In the same year, the Province of Alberta made an 
application to have paragraphs from the Ernst’s statement of claim struck for 
being “frivolous, irrelevant or improper;” 77 the ERCB similarly filed an 
application seeking an order to strike or in the alternative, sought summary 
judgment. Chief Justice Wittman for the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench 
dismissed Alberta’s application, but ruled in favor of the ERCB, striking both 
Ernst’s negligence and Charter claims against the regulator.78 Chief Justice 
Wittman came to this conclusion on the basis that section 43 of the Energy 
Resources Conservation Act (“ERCA”) provides statutory immunity for the 
regulator. Section 43 reads: 
No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a member of 
the Board or a person referred to in section 10 or 17(1) in respect of any act 
or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or any Act that the 
Board administers, the regulations under any of those Acts or a decision, 
order or direction of the Board.79 
Though finding that Ernst’s Charter claim was valid, Chief Justice Wittman 
stated that the above statutory provision amounted to an “absolute bar to Ernst’s 
claims against the ERCB.”80 Ernst appealed and the Alberta Court of Appeal 
unanimously upheld Wittman’s decision.81 The Charter issue was appealed to the 
                                                 
 73 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of The Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 27 (Can.) [hereinafter Charter]. 
 74 Ernst, Statement of Claim (2012), supra note 41, at 58. 
 75 Id. at 81-90. 
 76 Jessica Ernst v. EnCana Corporation, Energy Resources Conservation Board and Her 
majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, 0702-00120 (Sep. 16, 2013) (Alta QB) (EnCana’s 
Statement of Defence). 
 77 Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2013] A.B.Q.B. 537, 6-7, 101. 
 78 Id. at 130. 
 79 Energy Resources Conservation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c E-10, s43 (Can.). 
 80 Ernst ABQB, 0702-00120 (Sep. 16, 2013) (Alta QB) (EnCana’s Statement of Defence), 
at 130. 
 81 Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2014] A.B.C.A 285, at 19, 30. 
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Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), where in a (somewhat vexing)82 5-4 
decision, Justice Cromwell, writing for the majority, ruled that Ernst had failed to 
discharge her burden of demonstrating s. 43 of the ERCA to be unconstitutional. 
Thus, the immunity provision that “clearly purports to bar her damages claim 
must apply” and Ernst’s claim for Charter damages under s. 24(1) was struck 
down and the appeal dismissed.83 This decision has already been subject to 
criticism and has been held to “misconstrue the place of Charter damages in 
Canada’s constitutional architecture”84 and to have “worrisome implications for 
people across the country seeking to hold government appointed decision makers 
accountable for egregious unconstitutional actions.”85 
While this decision has numerous administrative and constitutional law 
implications that will likely be explored further by academics, what this decision 
means for Ernst and her civil action, is simply that she has one less defendant to 
pursue. Despite the fact that Ernst believes her case was strongest against the 
ERCB (she found them to be the most ‘guilty’ party),86 she is undeterred and will 
continue her action against EnCana and the Province of Alberta;87 an action that 
she has stated she would not be willing to settle.88 In an early conversation with 
her lawyer, Murray Klippenstein, when prodded about what she might do in the 
event of a multi-million-dollar settlement offer, Ernst responded that she would 
turn it down: “Murray, I’m not doing it for money, I’m doing it for justice.”89 
Ernst’s claim against the Province notwithstanding, what then, are her 
chances of receiving a judgment against the defendant oil and gas company? The 
only sensible answer to this question is: it depends, especially given the gap that 
can exist between precedential and authoritative legal materials and the final 
outcomes of cases.90 A significant legal hurdle that Ernst will have to overcome 
is establishing factual causation. Causation is an “essential element” for each of 
the causes of action (negligence, trespass, nuisance, the rule in Rylands v. 
                                                 
 82 Lorne Sossin, Damaging the Charter: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, THE 
COURT.CA (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.thecourt.ca/damaging-charter-ernst-v-alberta/. 
 83 Ernst S.C.C., supra note 43, at 23 [emphasis added]. 
 84 See Sossin, supra note 82; see also Julia Kindrachuck, Statutory Immunity from Charter 
Damages: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 78 Sask L Rev 379 (2015) (“Even before the 
case was heard at the SCC, there was consternation over the ABCA judgment and the court’s 
decision to upon the immunity provision in the face of a valid Charter claim. One particularly 
persuasive argument that subsequently emerged was that “statutory immunity provisions 
should not prevent plaintiffs from recovering public law damages for a regulator’s Charter 
breach). 
 85 Laura Track, Shut the Frack Up!, BC CIVIL LIBERTIES ASS’N (Jan. 11, 2017). 
 86 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 197. 
 87 Jessica Ernst, Jessica Ernst Open Letter to Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, ERNST V 
ENCANA CORPORATION.CA (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 88 Alberta Venture, Verbatim: Jessica Ernst’s Case against EnCana and the Alberta 
Energy Regulator, ALBERTA VENTURE (Dec. 3, 2015). 
 89 Nikiforuk, supra note 11, at 200. 
 90 Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
335, 336 (1998). 
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Fletcher) raised by Ernst.91 A closer examination of Ernst’s negligence claim 
against EnCana will serve to demonstrate the extent of this issue. 
C. Analysis of Negligence Claim: An Issue of Cause-in-Fact 
In short, in every negligence claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the 
defendant did not meet the standard of care that would be exercised by a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances (i.e. breach of the duty of care); (3) 
the careless conduct (as a matter of fact) caused the plaintiff’s loss; and (4) the 
loss is a legally recognized one that is not too remote to be recoverable.92 
Ernst alleges that EnCana owed her “a duty to exercise a reasonable standard 
of care, skill and diligence” to ensure that their extraction operations near her 
Rosebud property did not cause “water contamination or other harm to her or her 
property.”93 She alleges that EnCana breached this duty and caused her 
underground water supply to be contaminated with “methane, ethane and other 
hazardous chemicals.”94 Some of the specific claims levied against EnCana 
include (among others): 
(1) Inadequate or faulty cementing of the wellbores at the EnCana Wells; 
(2) Installing inadequate or faulty surface casing at the EnCana Wells; 
(3) Drilling, perforating, and fracturing above the Base of Groundwater 
Protection level as defined by the Water Act; 
(4) Failing to conduct adequate and reasonable groundwater testing and 
monitoring before, during, and after conducting Coal-Bed Methane 
activities. 
EnCana argues that while they owe a general duty of care to the public in 
carrying out their oil and gas operations, they did not owe Ernst a duty of care 
seeing as “[ . . . ] due to the extensive distances between the Ernst Well at the 
surface locations of the EnCana Wells, there was no reasonably foreseeable 
potential for harm to occur.”95 Alternatively, if a duty of care is found to exist, 
EnCana argues that they did not breach it because “at all material times [they] 
conducted the operations safely, diligently, and in accordance with accepted 
oilfield practices.”96 
Ernst will likely be able to satisfy the requirements of the two-stage Cooper 
Test97 in establishing that EnCana owed her a duty of care. In a case of 
                                                 
 91 Jeffrey C. King et al., Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture—
Groundwater Contamination Litigation, 22 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 341, 345 (2012). 
 92 Robert M. Solomon et al., Cases and Materials of the Law of Torts 297 (Thomson 
Reuters Canada ed., 9th ed. 2015). 
 93 Ernst, Statement of Claim (2012), supra note 41, ¶17. 
 94 Id. at 18. 
 95 EnCana, Statement of Defence, supra note 76, ¶16. 
 96 Id. at 17. 
 97 Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] S.C.C. 79, at 30. 
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environmental contamination like this one, “proximity will generally be 
established on the basis of foreseeable physical harm.”98 In this case, EnCana’s 
alleged unsafe, experimental, and strictly speaking, illegal99 drilling operations 
resulted in foreseeable harm to Ernst’s property (namely, her freshwater well); 
falling under a recognized category of proximity in the Cooper Test.100 Ernst 
should be able to establish, through expert testimony and her self-compiled and 
extensive record of EnCana’s drilling activities in the region,101 that EnCana’s 
unconventional drilling and fracturing of the coal seams that comprise the 
Rosebud aquifer gave rise to a legal duty of care. Accordingly, it was foreseeable 
that: (1) contamination of the aquifer was possible; and (2) Ernst relied on the 
aquifer as a source of drinking water. 
Additionally, there are no compelling external policy considerations outside 
the relationship of the parties that would negate such a finding. Policy 
considerations that EnCana could raise, like ‘disincentives to scientific 
innovation’ and/or the ‘economic utility of the conduct’ are unlikely to convince 
a court to negate prima facie liability given the grave environmental and public 
health consequences that can arise from negligently administered hydraulic 
fracturing operations.102 This shallow drilling, the lack of consultation, and the 
breach of various legislative and regulatory measures designed specifically to 
protect ground water103 all suggest that EnCana breached the standard of care 
expected of a reasonably prudent oil and gas developer. 
Where Ernst’s claim will run into a roadblock is in establishing that 
EnCana’s activities caused her loss. As previously mentioned, she bears the 
burden of establishing that EnCana’s negligent conduct did, as a matter of fact, 
cause the contamination of her well.104 More specifically, she will have to prove, 
on a balance of probabilities, that EnCana’s breach of the standard of care was 
the cause of her loss.105 The standard test for factual causation in Canada is the 
‘but-for test.’106 Despite the existence of variants of this standard (e.g., material 
                                                 
 98 Lynda Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, The Canadian law of Toxic Torts 
(Thomson Reuters ed., 2014). 
 99 See Ernst, Statement of Claim (2012), supra note 41, ¶16. (Ernst alleges that EnCana’s 
activities were in breach of the following legislative provisions: “ss. 3.060, 6.050 and 6.080(2) 
of the Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations; ss. 4.4, 7.9.9, 7.9.13, 7.10.7.2, and 7.10.11.3 of 
Guide 56 “Energy Development Applications and Schedules;” Informational Letter IL 91-11; 
Guide G-8; ss. 36(1) and 49(1) of the Water Act; s. 1.03(b) and 2.8, of the Groundwater 
Evaluation Guideline (Information Required when Submitting an Application under the Water 
Act); the Alberta Environment Guidelines for Groundwater Diversion; and ss. 109 and 110(1) 
of the Environment Protection and Enhancement Act). 
 100 See Cooper, S.C.C. at 36. 
 101 See Jessica Ernst, Brief Review of Threats to Canada’s Groundwater from Oil and Gas 
Industry’s Methane Migration and Hydraulic Fracturing, A PUB. INT. PROJECT BY ERNST 
ENVTL SERVICES (Jun. 16, 2013). 
 102 Collins & McLoed-Kilmurray, The Canadian Law of Toxic Torts, at 103 (2014). 
 103 Ernst, Statement of Claim, supra note 41, 16. 
 104 CED 4th (online), Negligence, ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION: DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT 
MUST CAUSE PLAINTIFF’S LOSS: GENERAL (II.3.(a)) at 28. 
 105 Solomon et al., supra note 92, at 596. 
 106 Id. 
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contribution), the but-for test applies for the majority of “toxic causation”107 
problems.108 Application of the but-for test has been summarized as follows: 
As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot succeed unless she shows as a matter 
of fact that she would not have suffered the loss “but-for” the negligent act 
or acts of the defendant. A trial judge is to take a robust and pragmatic 
approach to determining if a plaintiff has established that the defendant’s 
negligence caused her loss. Scientific proof is not required.109 
Despite this seemingly generous interpretation of the standard, it remains the 
case that “if the plaintiff does not establish [that the injury would not have 
occurred without the defendant’s negligence] on a balance of probabilities . . . 
her action against the defendant fails.”110 In toxic tort cases (like water 
contamination), the “causation element is widely regarded as the single biggest 
issue to recovery.”111 In these cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
both generic and specific causation. Generic causation refers to the capacity of 
the substance (e.g., methane and frack fluid chemicals) to cause the 
injury/damage complained of and specific causation is about whether the 
substance has actually caused the specific injury/damage.112 In hydraulic 
fracturing litigation, satisfying these causal requirements is especially difficult 
because, generally, the alleged source of the contaminant and the actual 
contaminated area (e.g., the underground fresh water aquifer) are typically 
thousands of feet below the earth’s surface, thus making the collection of causal 
evidence difficult, if not impossible. The issue of establishing factual causation 
has also emerged as a common roadblock in hydraulic fracturing tort litigation in 
the United States.113 As far as I am aware, no final judgement has succeeded (in 
either jurisdiction) against a “well operator, drilling contractor, or service 
company for contamination of groundwater resulting from hydraulic 
fracturing.”114 
Therefore, it seems that Ernst faces a difficult task in establishing a causal 
connection between EnCana’s hydraulic fracturing activities in Rosebud and the 
contamination of her groundwater. For one thing, there is nothing in Ernst’s fresh 
statement of claim to suggest that she has documentary evidence of baseline 
testing of the chemical composition of her water prior to 2001 (when EnCana is 
alleged to have begun hydraulic fracturing operations in the Rosebud area). This 
baseline testing is important because it creates a record of the chemical 
composition of the water quality prior to EnCana’s operations that can be 
                                                 
 107 See Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 98, at 1 (“A toxic tort can be defined as 
‘a tort arising from environmental contamination or a toxic product.’ Groundwater 
contamination from fracking is a tort of this variety”). 
 108 Id. at 150. 
 109 Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. at 181, at 43. 
 110 Id. at 8-9. 
 111 Collins & McLoed-Kilmurray, supra note 98, at 123. 
 112 Id. at 124. 
 113 See King et al., supra note 91. 
 114 Nicholson, supra note 1, at 1. 
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compared with post-operation levels. In this way, baseline data can be useful in 
determining if and when contamination occurred.115 
AER Directive 35, s. 2, mandates EnCana (and any other developer) to 
conduct baseline water well testing before it engages in Coal-Based Methane 
extraction.116 The directive specifically requires the operator, prior to drilling, to 
“test any active water wells and observation wells within a 600 meter (m) radius 
of the proposed well.”117 In their statement of defense, EnCana claims to have 
done this testing “before, during and after the operations in question.”118 In 
theory, this information could be revealed at trial. However, it is important to 
note that AER Directive 35 only came into effect in 2006, so it is likely that the 
contamination at issue, if it did occur, occurred prior to the baseline testing done 
by EnCana. Additionally, the Directive only requires EnCana to test water wells 
within a 600m to 800m radius of the drilling site. The nearest well alleged to 
have contaminated Ernst’s property is approximately three kilometers away.119 
Technically speaking, it is possible that EnCana could have complied with the 
Directive and done groundwater testing at wells within this 600m to 800m 
radius, but such compliance does not necessarily mean that Ernst’s well was 
included. As this action proceeds, it can be imagined that more information will 
become known relating to the existence, timeliness, and relevance of any 
baseline water testing. That said, even if credible and relevant baseline testing 
emerges and demonstrates a significant increase in contaminants in Ernst’s water 
supply, it by no means suggests that the ‘causation hurdle’ will be easily 
overcome. 
In Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., Anthony brought claims against Chevron 
for the negligent contamination of groundwater and soil on the family ranch. The 
family presented baseline water testing at trial and was able to demonstrate that 
the levels of chloride in their well increased from 380ppm in 1973 to 980ppm in 
1988;120 Chevron began hydraulically fracking for oil in “close proximity” to this 
well in 1971.121 Through the use of expert testimony, the plaintiffs presented 
evidence detailing how the aquifer came to be contaminated: the use of high 
pressure injections over several years caused the fracture to extend upward into 
the underground, thus resulting in contamination.122 Circuit Judge Emilio M. 
Garza found that the expert testimony failed to provide “any evidence 
establishing the nexus between Chevron’s water injection operations and the 
pollution.”123 Garza stated that the plaintiff was successful in raising “suspicions” 
about Chevron’s operations, but that there was insufficient evidence for a 
                                                 
 115 King et al., supra note 91, at 569. 
 116 Alberta, Directive 035 Baseline Water Well Testing Requirement for Coalbed Methane 
Wells Completed Above the Base of Groundwater Protection, Alberta Energy Regulator, s2 
(2006). 
 117 Id. 
 118 EnCana, Statement of Defence, supra note 76, at 17. 
 119 Id. at 14. 
 120 Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F. 3d 578, 581-82 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 121 Id. at 582. 
 122 Id. at 584. 
 123 Id. at 587. 
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reasonable jury to conclude that it was more likely than not that Chevron’s 
operations polluted the plaintiff’s well.124 One commentator believes that the 
evidence presented in Anthony was “more extensive than that submitted by most 
plaintiffs in similar suits because the plaintiffs were able to prove that 
contamination occurred . . . as well as factually plausible sources of fluid 
migration from the defendant’s fracturing wells.”125 Still, the plaintiffs were 
unable to establish a causal connection between hydraulic fracturing and the 
contamination. This outcome might be explained by the understandable lack of 
scientific literacy on the part of the judge, but it is still nonetheless potentially 
demonstrative of the strength of causal evidence that may be required in Ernst’s 
case. Whether Ernst is able to provide baseline water reports is arguably 
irrelevant if she cannot provide convincing evidence, on a balance of 
probabilities, that directly links EnCana’s drilling activities with the alleged 
increase in the toxicity of her well. Specifically, it will be difficult to establish 
that EnCana caused methane/frac-fluid chemicals to migrate out of the frack 
zone and into the underground aquifer. 
One reason for this difficulty is that our understanding of the effects of 
hydraulic fracturing is far from complete.126 Part of the problem is that it is 
difficult to predict how underground geological formations are going to react 
with any degree of precision when stimulated with high-pressure fracturing fluid. 
It is accepted that unintended fluid migration from the drilling site is a possibility 
and that groundwater can be contaminated by fracking fluids and natural gas,127 
but as evidenced in Anthony, a mere possibility is not enough to prove factual 
causation. Ernst will have to disprove the possibility that intermediary causes, 
like naturally-occurring methane gas,128 could be responsible for the rise in 
methane and not EnCana’s hydraulic fracturing operations. Additionally, she will 
have to prove that methane migration could occur over a distance of three 
kilometers (the location of her nearest well) and even over six kilometers (the 
location of her second well). The Duke University study mentioned above found 
methane concentrations close to active drilling sites to be seventeen times higher 
than in wells farther removed. However, ‘close’ for the purposes of this study, 
meant within one kilometer of an active drilling site; much closer than Ernst’s 
nearest well to EnCana’s operations. 
V. THE DEFECTS OF TORT: COMMON LAW REMEDIES ARE NOT THE ANSWER 
A. Tort Law Deficiencies 
With the above analysis in mind, if we assume that the function of tort law is 
to provide (1) compensation and (2) vindication to the plaintiff and to (3) punish 
                                                 
 124 Id. at 586. 
 125 King, supra note 91, at 159. 
 126 Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 66:3 
Case W. Res L. Rev. 1337, 1361 (2013). 
 127 Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 3, at 6-11, 6-57. 
 128 See Molofsky et al., supra note 34. 
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and (4) deter the defendant in the pursuit of (5) justice,129 it is evident that tort 
common law remedies have yet to fulfill any of these functions in hydraulic 
fracturing water contamination cases. 
For one thing, common law remedies are simply unavailable for the vast 
majority of plaintiffs in such cases. This is because seemingly all of the relevant 
causes of action require the plaintiff to establish that hydraulic fracturing was the 
proximate cause of the loss or harm complained of. Even under the strict liability 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s “non-
natural” use of the land brought about or accumulated control of a substance that 
caused damage to the plaintiff’s land.130 As evidenced above and given the 
current lack of complete understanding of the underground geological effects of 
hydraulic fracturing,131 it is a tall order for plaintiffs to establish causation on a 
balance of probabilities; even given its generous interpretation in Clements v. 
Clements. In this way, common law remedies are simply out of reach. 
Secondly, even when plaintiffs receive compensation from the defendants 
through settlements, these settlements are not likely deterring the tortious 
conduct. There have been numerous settlements between plaintiffs and oil and 
gas companies in the United States, thus serving the compensatory function 
(though not as a common law remedy), but many of these settlements have been 
made out-of-court and have been accompanied by a gag order and no admission 
of guilt by the defendant.132 In this way, functions two, three, four (and arguably 
five) of tort law, as outlined above, are not being achieved. Moreover, even if 
Ernst is successful in her lawsuit and she receives a just remedy, it is important 
to remember that Ernst’s case is a rare one; she has committed her entire life to 
it. It is likely that others adversely affected by hydraulic fracturing would be 
unwilling to go this far to hold negligent oil and gas operators to account, and 
understandably so. Presumably, not many families can sacrifice upwards of a 
decade of their time and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees in 
pursuing a single lawsuit. 
David E. Pierce argues that imposing civil liability on hydraulic fracturing 
operators would cause operators to limit their use of hydraulic fracturing and 
may even cause them to abandon the practice altogether.133 Since “it is not 
possible to control the precise location of fissures created by the fracturing 
process,” operators would open themselves up to potential liability with each 
well that they install.134 Given the difficulty of establishing this liability in the 
first place, I argue that operators will continue to profit from this ‘uncertain’ 
                                                 
 129 Solomon et al., supra note 92, at 20-23. 
 130 CED 4th (online) Negligence, ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION: DUTY OF CARE: DUTIES 
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STRICT LIABILITY: RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER (II.5.(c).(v)) at §229. 
 131 Howard, supra note 24, at 149. 
 132 Jim Efstathiou & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with Seale 
Settlements, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (Jun. 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-06-06/drillers-silence-fracg-claims-with-sealed-settlements; Nikiforuk, 
supra note 11, at 238; see also Watson, supra note 2. 
 133 David E. Piece, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U Pitt L Rev 
685, 686 (2011). 
 134 Id. 
17
Hutchinson: Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation: The Case of Jessica Ernst & the
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2018
 Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation  202 
practice despite lawsuits and, in borderline cases, will simply provide plaintiffs 
with a settlement offer that will allow the operation to continue at a profitable 
rate. In this way, the functions of tort law are not being achieved because the 
threat of a successful tort action is too small to be a deterrent to the continuation 
of the status-quo. In sum, the ineffectiveness of tort litigation in this area, when 
combined with the centralization of capital and power in the hands of oil and gas 
companies, breeds miscalculation at best, and indifference at worst, to the 
environmental consequences that may arise from hydraulic fracturing.135 Strict 
regulation is needed. 
B. The Need for Strict Regulation 
Tort law can achieve its functions only when it is able to exercise its reactive 
role and achieve a just form of redress for the plaintiff. A proactive approach is 
necessary in the case of hydraulic fracturing. Absent any major changes to the 
element of factual causation in common law toxic tort pleadings, I suggest that, 
due to the uncertainty of the process of hydraulic fracturing and the potential for 
great environmental harm, a robust regulatory framework is the best and only 
means of both: (1) ensuring hydraulic fracturing is done safely; and (2) that 
private landowners are protected and have an avenue for redress in the event of 
groundwater contamination. Researchers at Harvard Law School have prepared a 
report providing recommendations for how government agencies should regulate 
hydraulic fracturing and have provided four broad recommendations: 
(1) Require baseline testing and adopt statutory presumption of liability; 
(2) Establish robust administrative practices for handling water supply 
complaints; 
(3) Facilitate information distribution; 
(4) Allow for review of agency determinations.136 
Under the first recommendation, operators would be presumed liable for the 
“contamination and diminution of all water supplies” within the mandatory 
baseline sampling radius (however that is defined), but operators would be able 
to rebut the presumption “by affirmatively proving certain pre-established 
defenses, such as the absence of a ‘tracer’ chemical that fingerprints a chemical 
release belonging to that operator.”137 Illinois, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and 
West Virginia currently have presumptions of liability in place.138 This 
presumption of liability would take the issue of proximate causation out of the 
question by: (1) deterring reckless resource extraction; and (2) providing affected 
                                                 
 135 Richard L. Able, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8:2 Br J Law Soc 199, 199 (1981). 
 136 Cranch et al., supra note 4, at 6-8 [emphasis added]. 
 137 Id. at 6-7. 
 138 See Cranch et al., supra note 4, at 18 (“In North Carolina, it is presumed that an oil and 
gas developer is responsible for contamination of all water supplies that are within 5,000 feet 
of a wellhead”). 
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landowners with a statutory remedy (e.g., compensation for any damage to water 
supplies).139 
Alberta appears to have a strong regulatory framework for protecting the 
environment from the harms of hydraulic fracturing,140 but some evidence 
suggests that this framework is nothing more than a ‘Paper Tiger’. For one thing, 
there is no statutory presumption of liability in the legislation or regulations 
governing oil and gas development in the province. Second, while outside the 
scope of this paper, there is reason to believe that the industry has a substantial 
influence over the rules of regulation to the great detriment of the private 
landowner. Ernst believes that this industry influence was directly responsible for 
the AER’s refusal to hear and address her complaints of water contamination,141 
which ultimately led to her SCC appearance. Regulatory reform is necessary if 
hydraulic fracturing is to continue in the province. The provincial government 
would be wise to implement similar regulatory policies to those recommended in 
the Harvard study and should investigate the possibility of industry corruption in 
the AER.142 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this analysis, I have provided some historical context for the modern 
process of hydraulic fracturing; argued that establishing factual causation is a 
significant obstacle in holding oil and gas companies liable in groundwater 
contamination cases; and concluded that, because of the shortcomings of tort law 
in this area, strict regulation of fracking is necessary to protect people, property, 
and the environment. Using Ernst as a case study, I have forecasted an issue that 
the plaintiff may encounter in establishing factual causation in her pending 
lawsuit, namely: proving the factual nexus between her contaminated 
groundwater and EnCana’s fracking operations. 
 Until we know more about the precise geological consequences of hydraulic 
fracturing, a strict system of regulation that imposes a presumption of liability on 
oil and gas developers is the best available means for promoting safe extractive 
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processes. Such presumptions are no mere pipe dream; they are already in place 
in four U.S. states. In other words, this is an area where government cannot 
simply take a backseat. The profitability of hydraulic fracturing and the current 
lack of deterrence in the form of the threat of significant civil liability creates a 
regime that, if left to its own devices, will prioritize resource extraction to the 
detriment of the environment and its inhabitants. Safety, sustainability, and 
transparency in this sector require effective regulation. A legislated system needs 
to provide a means of redress (through statutory remedies) for injured private 
landowners, while also allowing industry to continue with its fracking 
operations, provided they fully comply with all laws and regulations. A 
purposeful and accountable regulatory body would accept nothing less. 
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